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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

l

Plaintiff/Petitioner, :
v.

t

MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN, aka
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS,

t

Case No.

Category Thirteen

Defendant/Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously reversed
respondent's conviction for manufacturing a controlled substance
and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance
and declared two subsections of the Utah Controlled Substances
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3) and, in part, 58-37-2(4), to be
unconstitutional.

Specifically, whether the Court erred in its

interpretation of State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), and
its conclusion that these provisions of the Act violate article
VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution because the provisions
incorporate the federal schedules of enumerated controlled
substances, as contained in the Federal Controlled Substances
Act, into the Utah schedules of enumerated controlled substances.
OPINION BELOW
State v. Green, No. 890222-CA (Utah Ct. App. May 23,
1990) (included as Appendix A ) .

-1-

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals based upon its reversal of defendant's
convictions for manufacturing a controlled substance and
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (Supp.
1988), respectively, and its declaration of two subsections of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3)
and, in part, 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988), unconstitutional.

The

opinion was filed on May 23, 1990. No petition for rehearing was
filed.

On June 19, 1990, this Court granted an extension of time

in which to file this petition to July 8, 1990. This Court has
jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 782-2(3)(a) and (5) (Supp. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Const, art. VI, § 1 (in relevant part):
The Legislative power of the State shall be
vested:
(1) In a Senate and House of
Representatives which shall be designated the
Legislature of the State of Utah.
(2) In the people of the State of Utah, as
hereinafter stated . . . .
Utah Const, art. V, § 1:
The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.

-2-

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(3) (Supp. 1988):
(3) Whenever any substance is designated,
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V or
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title
II, P.O. 91-513), as such schedules may be
revised by Congressional enactment or by
administrative rule of the United States
Attorney General adopted pursuant to § 201 of
that act, that subsequent designation,
rescheduling or deletion shall govern.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988):
(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor included in
schedules I, II, III, IV or V of Section 5837-4, and also includes a drug, substance, or
immediate precursor included in schedules I,
II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, as
those schedules may be revised to add,
delete, or transfer substances from one
schedule to another, whether by Congressional
enactment or by administrative rule of the
United States Attorney General adopted under
Section 201 of that act. Controlled
substance does not include distilled spirits,
wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding
tobacco or food.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, Michael Lewis Green, was charged with two
second degree felonies, manufacturing a controlled substance and
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (Supp.
1988), respectively.

Respondent was convicted in the First

District Court, Box Elder County, the Honorable Gordon J. Low,
presiding.
On May 23, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the
convictions and held that two subsections of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3) and 58-37-2(4) are
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unconstitutional and interpreted the provisions to be inconsistent with article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
Because the Court of Appeals viewed this issue as dispositive, it
did not reach the remaining issues presented by respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was convicted of manufacturing a controlled
substance and possession of a controlled substance following a
jury trial on February 27 to March 2, 1989. A man who was
working for defendant at his home observed what appeared to be a
drug manufacturing laboratory in defendant's garage (T. 343,
346).

He later reported his observations to a deputy sheriff (T.

349).

After a period of surveillance of the premises, officers

executed a search warrant and found a large quantity of drugs and
chemicals in the garage (T. 51, 55).
Chuck Hall, a chemist for the Drug Enforcement
Administration, testified that in his opinion the laboratory in
defendant's garage was set up for production of phenyl-2-propanone
(T. 106-07).

Under Mr. Hall's direction samples were taken of

thirteen chemicals.

These chemicals were tested by Art Terkelson

at the Weber State Crime Lab.
The samples were found to contain phenyl-2-propanone
(T. 232-235) which is a precursor to the production of
methamphetamine, and phenylacetic acid which is a precursor to the
production of phenyl-2-propanone (113, 118). Officers found
fifteen 50-gallon drums of phenylacetic acid on defendant's
premises.

They also found chemical formulas for the production of

phenyl-2-propanone using phenylacetic acid (T. Ill), and formulas
for the production of phenylacetic acid (T. 112).
-4-

Following respondent's conviction, he appealed to the
Utah Court of Appeals.

He argued that the affidavit in support of

the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause,
that the informant was acting as an agent for the state and should
be bound by the exclusionary rule, that defendant was denied due
process because only samples of the chemicals were retained as
evidence and the remaining amount was destroyed because it
constituted hazardous waste, that the incorporation of the
controlled substances contained in the federal schedules into the
Utah schedules violated the separation of powers doctrine, and
that the trial court erred in failing to give a requested jury
instruction.

The Court of Appeals reversed on the argument that

the incorporation of the federal schedules was unconstitutional
and, therefore, it did not reach the remaining issues.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REVERSED
RESPONDENT'S CONVICTION AND ERRONEOUSLY
DECLARED UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-3(3) & 5837-2(4) UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THESE SUBSECTIONS
OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT ARE NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH CONST. ART. VI, § 1.
In State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) (included
as Appendix B), this Court held that a provision of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act that allowed the Utah Attorney General
to add or delete substances from the controlled substances
schedules

was an unconstitutional delegation of power in

violation of article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.

The

provision of the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(2), provided;
The controlled substances are enumerated in schedules I, II,
III, IV, or V of section 58-37-4.

-5-

"The attorney general of the state of Utah shall administer the
provisions of this act and may add or delete substances or
reschedule all substances enumerated in the schedule in section
58-37-4 . . . ."

Following the Gallion decision, the Act was

revised and no longer contains this provision.
This Court, in Gallionf found the former statute to be
in contravention with the separation of powers provision of
article V, section 1, which provides:
The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Utah Const, art. V, § 1.

This Court noted that the Utah attorney

general is a member of the executive department and, therefore,
had an obvious potential conflict.

The attorney general has the

duty of challenging possible unconstitutional provisions of
statutes and could be placed in the "anomalous position of
exercising a potential challenge to a law he has, in fact,
amended."

JEd. at 686.
After holding that the statute violated the separation

of powers provision of article V, section 1, this Court stated
that "[t]he other aspect of this case which merits response is
whether the Controlled Substances Act has improperly delegated
legislative power."

^Id. at 687. Because the attorney general

determined what substances could be controlled and also scheduled
the substances, the procedure allowed him, in effect, to

-6-

determine the penalty for the crime.

Id. at 689.

The majority-

concluded that a determination of the elements and punishment of
a crime are exclusive functions of the legislature.
In arriving at its conclusion, this Court noted State
v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913), a case in which this
Court reversed the defendant's conviction for "the infamous crime
against nature."

Although the defendant's acts were revolting,

"in the absence of legislative enactment making such acts
criminal and punishable, [we cannot] denounce them as crimes. To
do so would in effect be judicial legislation."

jki. at 634.

This Court cited article V, section 1, the separation of powers
provision, in support of its holding that the Court could not
judicially legislate.

Relying on Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380,

483 P.2d 425 (1971), this Court again noted that it does not have
the power to judicially legislate.

In Belt, the issue was

whether prisoners who committed a crime before a sentencing
statute was amended to provide a lesser penalty, but were
sentenced after the amendment, were entitled to be resentenced
under the more lenient provision.

This Court stated:

"The power

of the legislature to repeal or amend the penalty to be imposed
for a crime is not a matter of judicial concern," id. at 425, and
noted that the power of the legislature to punish crime is
"practically unlimited."

Id. at 426 (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d,

Criminal Law, SS 577-78).
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At no point in Gallion, or the Utah cases upon which it
2
relied, did this Court hold that article VI, section 1

of the

Utah Constitution precludes the legislature from incorporating
into its statutory scheme statutes enacted in another
jurisdiction.
A. The Court of Appeals Erred in Reaching the Issue of
the Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Controlled
Substances Act.
"It is a well-established rule that legislative
enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and
will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no
reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming
to constitutional requirements."

In re Criminal Investigation/

7th Dist. Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (citing
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974)).

See also

State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987); Murray City v. Hall,
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983).

The appellate court must look to the

"reasonable or actual legislative purpose" in evaluating
constitutional challenges.

J^d.

The burden is on the challenging

party to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute.
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984).
doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.

Rio
All

Ellis v.

Social Service Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980).

Utah Const, art. VI, § 1: "The Legislative power to the State
shall be vested: 1. In a Senate and House of Representatives
which shall be designated the Legislature of the State of Utah.
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter
stated . . . • • •
-8-

Further, if a case can be disposed of on some other
ground, an appellate court should not reach the issue of the
constitutionality of a statute.

State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d

1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this Court
should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to
do so.").

See also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982), limited on other grounds, State v.
Eloge, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988); Goodsel v. Department of
Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1974).
In the present case, evidence at trial established that
P-2-P, the substance at issue, was a precursor to methamphetamine (T. 118). Under the Utah Controlled Substances Act, as it
existed in 1988 and absent any reliance on the Federal Act, P-2-P
was controlled.

Methamphetamine is a schedule II drug.

Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (Supp. 1988).

Utah

Under Utah law,

a controlled substance includes a drug enumerated on the Utah
schedules and its immediate precursors.
2(4).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

Because P-2-P is an immediate precursor to meth-

amphetamine, the Court of Appeals did not need to reach the issue
of the constitutionality of the provisions of the statutes that
incorporate the federal schedules, §§ 58-37-3(3) and -4(2).

Even

absent the adoption of the federal schedules, respondent's
manufacture and possession of P-2-P would have violated Utah law.
B. Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3) and 58-37-2(4) Do Not
Provide For An Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power
in Violation of Article VI, Section I of the Utah Constitution.
In Green, the Court of Appeals held that the provisions
that allow adoption of the federal schedules do not violate

-9-

article V# section 1, the separation of powers provision, of the
Utah Constitution.
The purpose of this state constitutional
provision is to prohibit concentration of
legislative and executive powers of the state
government in one person. . . . As Gallion
makes clear, the delegation doctrine in Utah
is found in our state constitution, not in
judicial decisions. The court held that,
although article V, section 1 does not
prohibit delegation of legislative power per
se, it does bar the delegation of legislative
functions to persons in the executive
department, in order to avert concentration
of power. . . . This holding concerning
article V, section 1 is not applicable in the
present case because the 1979 changes in the
Act conferred Utah legislative functions upon
a person outside of state government,
diffusing power, not concentrating it.
State v. Green, No. 890222-CA, slip op. at 6 (Utah Ct. App. May
23, 1990).
The Court of Appeals then stated that the Gallion
Court's "other holding" is dispositive in this case: Article VI,
section 1 of the Utah Constitution precludes the Utah
legislature's ability to delegate its powers as it has done by
incorporating the federal controlled substance schedules into the
Utah Act.

The Court held that these provisions, Utah Code Ann §§

58-37-3(3) and 58-37-4(2), unconstitutionally delegate the power
to add P-2-P and other substances to the Utah schedules and
thereby "define its manufacture or possession as a crime and fix
the penalty for that crime."

Green, slip op. at 6.

The United States Code provides that the United States
Attorney General may by rule add, delete, or transfer a drug from
the controlled substance schedules.

21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1982).

The statute mandates that the rules must be made on the record
-10-

after a hearing has been held.

Id.

Changes in the rules may be

instigated by the attorney general on his own motion, at the
request of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or at the
request of any interested party.

Id.

The federal act specifies standards and safeguards
under which substances can be added or deleted to limit arbitrary
or scientifically unsound changes in the schedules.

See, e.g.,

21 U.S.C. 811(b) and (c) (1982).
Section 812 governs the scheduling procedure and
requires, with limited exceptions, that requisite findings be
ma'de before a drug is placed on a particular schedule.

For

example, to be placed on schedule I, there must be findings that
the drug has high potential for abuse, the drug has no medically
accepted use in treatment, and that there is a lack of accepted
safety for the use of the drug under medical supervision.
U.S.C. 812(b)(1) (1982).

21

The remaining four schedules require

similar types of findings.

Thus, the substances cannot be added

to a particular schedule based upon administrative whim.
Numerous challenges have been made in the federal
courts to this delegation of authority by Congress to the
Attorney General.

The federal courts have universally held that

the delegation meets constitutional scrutiny.

See, e.g., United

States v. Emerson, 846 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Hope, 714 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Alexander,
673 F.2d 287 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 876 (1982);
United States v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
439 U.S. 1051 (1978); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d
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Cir. 1977); United States v, Davis, 564 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Iske v. United States, 396
F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Suquet, 551 F.Supp.
1194 (N.D. 111. 1982).
The seminal United States Supreme Court case addressing
the issue of legislative delegation of power is United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).

In Grimaud, the Supreme Court

upheld a conviction for violating a forest grazing regulation
promulgated by the secretary of agriculture.

The Court noted

that in enacting the Forest Reserve Act, Congress had stated that
a violation of rules and regulations would be punished.

Thus,

Congress, not the secretary of agriculture, had determined that
violations of the Act would be a crime.
This Court attempted to distinguish Grimaud in Gallion,
stating that under the Utah Controlled Substance Act, the Utah
attorney general (under the former provision) not only determined
what substances should be controlled, but also determined the
schedule and, therefore, the applicable penalty.

Gallion, 572

P.2d at 688-89. Again, the statutory scheme has been revised and
the Utah attorney general no longer has this authority.

Still,

however, the issue remains with respect to delegation of
authority to penalize crimes.

Other courts have examined this

issue and determined that this delegation does not allow an
administrator to determine that certain acts involving controlled
substances are criminal, but rather grants the power to determine
the chemicals that satisfy the legislative requirements for
control.

In United States v. Suquet, 551 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D.
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111. 1982), the court rejected the defendant's argument that
Grimaud does not allow Congress to delegate power under which the
executive determines not only which particular transactions are
criminal, but also the penalties to be imposed.

Jd. at 1197.

The court stated:
Grave constitutional questions would be
present if Congress had legislated the
following law:
Distribution of any substance
determined by the administrator
to meet the requirements for
control established herein shall
be illegal. The penalty for
such distribution shall be as
the Administrator provides by
rule.
See Gelhorn, Administrative Prescription and
Imposition of Penalties, 1970 Wash. U.L.Q.
265, 268-71; see also United States v.
Batchelder 442 U.S. 114, 125-26 . . . (1979).
The Controlled Substances Act, however, is
quite clearly of a different mold. Congress
did not grant the Administrator the power to
determine which penalties should be imposed
upon which sorts of generic violations (e.g.,
possession with intent to distribute a
Schedule II substance). Congress itself made
these determinations. The Administrator was
authorized to do nothing more than determine
which substances belong within which
Schedule. This is entirely permissible under
Grimaud.
Id. at 1197-98.
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that
because different schedules carry differing penalties, the
administrator has too much control over the punishment to be
imposed.

The court stated that the argument failed for two

reasons.

First, the detailed criteria in sections 812(b)(l)-(5)

govern on which schedule a substance will be placed.
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Id. at

1198.

Second, there is always some discretion in a Grimaud

situation.

In Grimaud, the secretary could implicitly determine

the penalty by determining whether or not to make grazing without
a permit a crime; thus, he had at least two choices.

Under the

Controlled Substances Act, the secretary is, under some
circumstances, given a few more options, but they are subject to
rigid standards.

"If the Forest Reserve Act passed muster [in

Grimaud1, so must the Controlled Substances Act."

Ld. at 1198.

Legislative delegation of power to executive and
administrative agencies is essential to the operation of
government.

See Williams, Police Rulemaking Revised:

Some New

Thoughts On An Old Problem, Vol. 47: No. 4 Law & Comtemp. Prob.
148 (1984).

Most other courts have held that the legislature may

delegate its powers regarding criminal measures, so long as there
are adequate standards and safeguards to assure that the
administrator cannot abuse the discretion the legislature has
conferred.

See, e.g., People v. Lowrie, 761 P.2d 778 (Colo.

1988) (legislature's delegation of authority to administrative
agency regarding control of alcoholic beverages was not an
unlawful delegation of power to define criminal conduct); Clark
County Sheriff v. Lugman, 101 Nev. 149, 697 P.2d 107 (1985)
(Controlled Substances Act did not unconstitutionally delegate
power to board of pharmacy to define criminal conduct); State v.
Peloquin 427 A.2d 1327 (R.I. 1981) (the Controlled Substances Act
did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to the
state director of health because the Act required the director to
adopt the federal schedules or to justify the exclusion); Montoya
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v, O'Toole, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 (1980) (allowing the state
board of pharmacy to schedule drugs was not an unconstitutional
delegation of authority where the authority was subject to
legislative standards); State v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 92 Wash.
2d 894, 602 P.2d 1172 (1979) (the proscribed criminal conduct was
defined by the legislature; therefore, it was not improper to
delegate power to an administrator to adopt regulations); State
v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514 (1977) (designation of
substances as controlled based upon other state laws, the federal
law, or a regulation by the state board of pharmacy was not an
unconstitutional delegation of authority); People v. Uriel, 57
Mich. App. 419, 225 N.W.2d 788 (1977) (Controlled Substances Act
did not unconstitutionally delegate power to the board of
pharmacy because there were adequate guidelines for scheduling
drugs).
CONCLUSION
The State of Utah respectfully submits that the Court
of Appeals has decided an important question of state law that
should be settled by this Court.

Based upon Rule 46(d), Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the foregoing arguments and
authorities, the State requests that this Court grant its
petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to
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review the Court's reversal of defendant's conviction and its
declaration as unconstitutional two subsections of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act.
DATED this

day of July, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

BEARNSC
tant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed,
postage prepaid, to Daniel Knowlton, attorney for respondent, 434
East South Temple, Suite 2, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
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day of July, 1990.
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JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant Michael Lewis Green appeals his convictions of
two second-degree felonies, manufacturing a controlled
substance and possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, in violation of the Utah Controlled Substances Act,
Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (i v) (Supp. 1 988)
respectively, We reverse,
The controlled substance involved :i : both counts was
phenyl-2-propanone (P2P). Defendant asserts that certain
provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act improperly
delegated legislative power by permitting the United States
Attorney General prospectively to add P2P as a controlled
substance under the Utah criminal statute. Because it
delegates the definition of the elements of, and the penalty
for, a Utah crime, defendant argues, the statute violates
article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which vests
legislative power in the Utah Legislature.

The Utah Controlled Substances Act, enacted in 1971 Utah
Laws, ch. 145 (effective January 1, 1972), established five
schedules of specified drugs, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (1974),
and defined a "controlled substanceH in Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-2(5) (1974) as a drug, substance, or immediate
precursor in those schedules. The legislature gave the Utah
Attorney General prospective authority to designate a substance
as an Mimmediate precursor," Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(23)
(1974), and to reschedule substances, add substances to, or
delete substances from the Utah schedules by following the
procedures set forth in section 58-37-5. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 58-37-3(2) to -3(7) (1974).
The Act was substantially amended in 1979 Utah Laws, ch. 12
(effective May 8, 1979). The definition of Hcontrolled
substance" was expanded beyond those drugs enumerated in the
Utah schedules, to include a
drug, substance, or immediate precursor
included in schedules I, II, III, IV or V
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as those
schedules may be revised to add, delete,
or transfer substances from one schedule
to another, whether by Congressional
enactment or by administrative rule of the
United States Attorney General adopted
pursuant to § 201 of that act.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988).1 Through 1979 Utah
Laws ch. 12, § 2, the delegation of prospective authority to
the Utah Attorney General in section 58-37-3(2) through -3(7)
was stricken. In its place, the declaration of what substances
were McontrolledM was amended to add the following to those
substances actually listed in the section 58-37-4 schedules:
(2) All controlled substances listed in
the Federal Controlled Substances Act
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended
from time to time, are hereby controlled.
1. The actual amendatory language varied slightly in form, but
not in content, from that in effect when Green was arrested and
charged. See 1979 Utah Laws, ch. 12, § 1. Although the
subsection has undergone additional stylistic changes since
1988, the definition of controlled substances in Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-2(4) (1990) remains essentially the same.

(3) Whenever any substance is designated,
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules
may be revised by Congressional enactment
or by administrative rule of the United
States Attorney General adopted pursuant
to § 201 of that act [21 U.S.C.A. § 811],
that subsequent designation, rescheduling
or deletion, shall govern,
Utah Code Anx i § 58-37 3 (1986).
When defendant was arrested and charged in September 1988,
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1988),2 set forth four
categories of prohibited acts involving controlled substances.
The punishment for the proscribed conduct varied, as it does
under the current version of the Act, depending on the schedule
in section 58-37-4 in which the particular controlled substance
was listed. A violation of section 58-37-8(1)(a) was
punishable as a second-degree felony if it involved a substance
from schedule I or II; as a third-degree felony if the
substance was classified in Schedule III or IV; and as a class
A misdemeanor if the substance was classified in Schedule V.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (Supp. 1988)
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a) (Supp. 1988) provided:
(a) Except as authorized r>i
chapter, it is unlawful for any person
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, ui aisy
to possess with intent to produce
manufacture, or dispense, -» -o^t-^ .;;*
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute
a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in
the course of his business as a sales
representative of a manufacturer or
distributor of substances listed in
Schedules II through V except under
order or prescription;
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit
substance with i ntent to di stribute.

In this case, Green was charged with possession and
manufacture of P2P as a controlled substance. P2P was not
listed as a controlled substance in the Utah schedules in
section 58-37-4.3 Nor was P2P listed as a controlled
substance in the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 812 (1981), on the January 1, 1972, effective date of the
Utah Controlled Substances Act, or on the May 8, 1979,
effective date of the amendment of sections 58-37-2(5) and
-3(3) of the Utah Act. Furthermore, P2P had not been added to
the federal schedules by administrative action on those dates.
However, the State asserts that P2P was administratively
-added" to Utah's Schedule II after May 8, 1979, by the United
States Attorney General, pursuant to the delegated authority in
the 1979 amendment of sections 58-37-2(5) and -3(3). By
administrative action effective February 11, 1980, the United
States Attorney General placed phenylacetone (also known as
phenyl-2-propanone, P2P, benzyl methyl ketone, or methyl benzyl
ketone) on federal Schedule II as an immediate precursor to
methamphetamine and amphetamine.4 21 C.F.R. § 1308.21
3. The Utah Controlled Substances Precursor Act, which took
effect April 1, 1989, lists phenylacetic acid and
phenylpropanolamine and their salts as precursor chemicals.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-2(5) (1990).
4. The 1979 amendment to the Utah Controlled Substances Act
incorporated the Federal Controlled Substances Act, which was
first enacted by Congress on October 27, 1970. 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 801 to 904 (1981). Section 811(e) allows the United States
Attorney General to add "immediate precursors," defined in 21
U.S.C.A. § 802(34)(A) (Supp. 1990), to the federal schedules of
controlled substances without going through the normal
administrative rulemaking process otherwise necessary for
scheduling a drug or substance. This summary procedure was
used by the United States Attorney General to amend 21 C.F.R.
§ 1308.12, effective February 11, 1980, by adding the following
subsection to federal Schedule II:
(f) Immediate precursors. Unless
specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any
quantity of the following substances:
(1) Immediate precursor to amphetamine
and methamphetamine:
(i) Phenylacetone-8501

(1981); 4 i Fed. Reg. iiu,/' (1979). Cieeii responds that,
because the delegation of legislative power to the federal
officer in the 1979 amendment to the Utah Act violates the Utah
Constitution, federal administrative action after May 8, 1979,
adding P2P to the federal schedule could not validly add P2P fi
the Utah schedule of controlled substances,5
Before Utah's amendment of the Act in 1 979/ as discussed
above, the Utah Legislature had vested authority in the Utah
Attorney General to add substances to the Utah schedules by
future administrative action, That delegation of legislative
power was challenged in State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah
1977), and held unconstitutional, perhaps prompting the 1979
legislative changes to the Act, which simply substituted a
delegation of the same prospective lawmaking authoritv t i
I Tnited States Attorney General
The first question in Gallion was whether the 1979
enactment had violated the separation of powers provision in
Utah Constitution article V, section 1, by granting power to
the Utah Attorney General to, in effect, amend the Utah
Controlled Substances Act by adding, deleting, or rescheduling
a controlled substance. That section of the state constitution
provides:
The powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
(Footnote 4 continued)
Some trade or other names: phenyl-2-propano
;
benzyl methyl ketone; methyl benzyl ketone.
(2) Immediate precursors to phencyclidine (PCP):
(i) l-phenylcyclohexylamine-7460
(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC)-8603
5. Green's appeal does not involve a substance that, on
May 8, 1979, effective date of the amendment of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act, was a federally scheduled controlled
substance as the result of either federal administrative or
congressional action. We, therefore, do not address the issue
of the extent to which the Utah Legislature may, consistent
with the state constitution, adopt another jurisdiction's laws
and administrative rules defining the elements of a crime and
the penalty therefor.

charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these
departments/ shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
The purpose of this state constitutional provision is to
prohibit concentration of legislative and executive powers of
the state government in one person. See Gallion, 572 P.2d at
686. Because there is no provision in the federal constitution
comparable to article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution,
the court pointed out# federal case law concerning the
delegation of legislative power is not helpful in interpreting
the Utah constitutional provision. I£. As Gallion makes
clear, the delegation doctrine in Utah is found in our state
constitution, not in judicial decisions. The court held that,
although article V, section 1 does not prohibit delegation of
legislative power per se, it does bar the delegation of
legislative functions to persons in the executive department,
in order to avert concentration of power. !£. at 687. This
holding concerning article V, section 1 is not applicable in
the present case because the 1979 changes in the Act conferred
Utah legislative functions upon a person outside of state
government, diffusing power, not concentrating it.
However, we agree with Green that the Gallion court's other
holding, which pertains to the limits in Utah Constitution
article VI, section 1 on the Utah Legislature's ability to
delegate its legislative powers, is dispositive in his case.
Because Utah Constitution article VI, section 1 vests
legislative power in the Utah Legislature, Green contends that
the Utah Legislature could not constitutionally delegate to any
person or agency the power to add P2P or anything else to those
scheduled substances that are controlled under Utah law, and
thereby define its manufacture or possession as a crime and fix
the penalty for that crime.
In Gallion, a necessary element of the crime was that the
proscribed conduct involve a controlled substance. There, the
crime charged was the making of a false or forged prescription
for a controlled substance. Here, a necessary element of the
crime is that the proscribed conduct involve a controlled
substance. Here, the crimes charged are the manufacture and
possession of a controlled substance. In Gallion, the
controlled substance, Demerol, was placed on Utah Schedule II

by the Utah Attorney General through the mandated rulemaking
process, so that any proscribed conduct involving it
constituted a third-degree felony. Here, once the United
States Attorney General administratively added P2P as a
controlled substance on Utah schedule II, any proscribed
conduct involving P2P purportedly constituted a second-degree
felony,
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Gallion, 572 P.2d at
687, that article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which
vests legislative power in the Utah Legislature, limits the
legislature's ability to delegate that power to others.
Reiterating that there are certain "essential legislative
functions- that cannot be delegated, M * at 688,5 the Gallion
court held that the "determination of the elements of a crime
and the appropriate punishment therefor are, under our [Utah]
Constitutional system, judgments, which must be made
exclusively by the legislature.- J&. at 690; see also State v.
Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913) (it Is for the
legislature, not the courts, to defi ne what, constitutes
criminal conduct).7
The Utah Supreme Court identified sound reasons for its
ruling that the definition of a crime and the punishment for
are essential legislative functions that cannot be delegated
ai"! administrative agency: 8 {] ) criminal trials wot il d be
6. See also Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d
734, 740-41 (1936) (power to determine amount of tax penalty is
nondelegable legislative function); Western Leather and Finding
Co, v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526, 528 (1935)
(imposition of a tax and designation of who must pay it are
essential legislative functions, which legislature cannot
delegate to state agency).
/. Ais the court noted, in Gallion, 572 P.2d at 688, the state
constitutional requirement that the essential legislative
function of specifying and punishing conduct as criminal be
performed by the legislature itself, not by administrative
agency action, is incorporated into Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-105
(1978), which states: "Common law crimes are abolished and no
conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other
applicable statute or ordinance.11
8. Although the Utah Liui>feme Supreme Court has recognized that
there is "a certain peril involved i £ administrative procedures
can be applied to the criminal law,fi Gallion. 572 P.2d at 690,
courts in other states have not been as perceptive.

unduly complicated because a defendant could challenge the
administrative procedures and findings underlying the
scheduling of a substance; and (2) because administrative
rulings are not codified, citizens would have to resort to
records outside the Utah Code to determine the status of a
particular substance.9 Gallion. 572 P.2d at 689-90.
Gallion squarely held that crime definition and penalty
powers are essential legislative functions that cannot
constitutionally be delegated by the Utah Legislature to any
other person or body. Nonetheless, the legislatures
subsequent amendment of the Act in 1979 ignored the limits on
delegation of its powers in Utah Constitution article VI,
section 1, articulated by the Gallion court. Because we are
(Footnote 8 continued)
Intentionally or not, they have permitted administrative law
principles, state and federal, to creep into their decisions
and dictate their criminal law. For example, see State v.
Kellogg. 98 Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514, 516-18 (1977), in which
the court cited state and federal administrative law decisions
and Professor Davis's treatise in a criminal case like Gallion
involving the sale of a prescription drug. In Kellogg,
scheduling of prescription drugs as controlled substances was
statutorily delegated to the Idaho Board of Pharmacy. This
delegation was upheld because the statute (1) contained a
declaration of policy; (2) selected the agency to effectuate
the policy; and (3) defined the limits of the Board's power.
The court in Montova v. 0*Tooele. 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190
(1980), involving possession of Valium, also used
administrative law concepts. There, the legislature had
delegated to the State Board of Pharmacy the power to schedule
drugs and controlled substances under New Mexico criminal law.
The delegation was upheld because the delegation was
accompanied with strict guidelines, clear standards, and
definite duties. The court, using administrative law
principles, found this scheme to allow the Board only minimal
discretion in the fact-finding function and to give the Board
no discretion in enacting substantive law.
9. The State makes a public policy argument in support of the
Utah Legislature's delegation of lawmaking authority to the
United States Attorney General, namely, the "enormous burden"
placed on the legislature to monitor thousands of new drugs
developed each year. See Kellogg, 568 P.2d at 517; Montoya,
610 P.2d at 192. There is, however, nothing in this record to
support these claims.

unable to distinguish Gallion on this controlling point, we
conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(3) (1986) and Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988), violate article VI, section 1
of the Utah Constitution insofar as they allow the United
States Attorney General to add substances to the Utah schedules
of controlled substances after May 8, 1979. Accordingly, P2P
was not a substance controlled by the statute under which Green
was charged# and we are compelled to reverse Green's
convictions on this ground.
In light of this conclusion, we need not address Green's
remaining arguments. However, we need to delineate the scope
of our constitutional ruling.
Defendant has not challenged the entire Utah Controlled
Substances Act as unconstitutional, ge_e note 5, supra. He has
attacked only the provisions added by the 1979 amendments to
the Act, effective May 8, 1979, in which the United States
Attorney General was granted prospective legislative power to
amend the Utah statute by adding, deleting, or transferring
substances on,, the federal schedules.
The applicable rule of statutory construct m i
ci tcumstances is that,

MI h

statutes, where possible, are to be
construed so as to sustain their
constitutionality. Accordingly, i£ a
portion of the statute might be saved by
severing the part that is unconstitutional,
such should be done.
Celebrity club j n C m v . utah Licruor Control Comm'n, bb J P. 2d
1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). This basic rule applies to the
construction of criminal statutes. State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah
2d 66, 426 P.2d 13, 15 (1967). Where part of a statute is
unconstitutional, severability is primarily a matter of
legislative intent, Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977), which a court
ascertains by determining whether the remaining portions of the
enactment can stand alone and serve a legitimate purpose.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P„ 2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985) .
The provisions challenged by Green were apparently added to
the Act separately as a response, albeit an inadequate one, to
the decision in Gallion. We believe the legislature intended
that the remaining provisions be enforced independent of the

1979 amendments for the legitimate purpose of punishing conduct
involving those substances expressly included in the schedules
in section 58-37-4. The remaining provisions were enforced in
this same manner during the period between the Gallion decision
on November 17, 1977, and the effective date of the 1979
amendment of the Act. We conclude that Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-3(3) (1986) and the portion of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) delegating legislative power to the
United States Attorney General are severable from the remaining
portions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act.
The convictions are reversed.

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

I CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge

BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
I agree that the Controlled Substances Act passes
constitutional muster under article V# section 1# of the Utah
Constitution. I disagree, however, with the majority's
conclusion that the Act violates article VI# section 1.
When we are faced with a challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute/ we must adhere to the rule that "legislative
enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity
and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no
basis upon which they can be construed as conforming to
constitutional requirements.* In re Criminal Investigation,
754 P.2d 633/ 640 (Utah 1988) (citing Greaves v. State, 528
P.2d 805/ 806-07 (Utah 1974)).
The main opinion reverses defendant's convictions on the
authority of State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977). The
narrow holding of Gallion is that the former Act was an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine
of article V since it allowed the executive in charge of

enforcing the law to exercise legislative functions. The
opinion could have, and for clarity's sake, arguably should
have, stopped there. Instead, it went on to talk about
improper legislative delegation.
My colleagues suggest that this dicta was framed under
article VI. I disagree. The legislative delegation discussion
in Gallion was framed under statute and case law.1 The
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1974), provided as
follows: "Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a
crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or
ordinance.- The case, State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632
(1913), held that under article V (not VI), courts may not
denounce and punish as crimes acts and omissions not made
punishable by statute.
By the Controlled Substances Act, the legislature has
criminalized the manufacture, distribution, and possession of
controlled substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)
(1990). The legislature has given a federal agency the task of
identifying the particular substances to be controlled. Such
delegation of responsibility is not, on its face, an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See
Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: Some New Thoughts on an
Old Problem, 47:4 Law & Contemp. Probs. 123 (Autumn 1984).
Whether our statute is unconstitutional should turn not on
article VI, but on whether the legislature has adequately
identified standards and procedural safeguards for the
placement of substances on the schedules. See generally,
Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713
(1969).
From a practical viewpoint, the prohibition against
legislative delegation cannot be absolute. As explained by
Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion in Gallion:
[D]ue to the complexities of human
society, which are ever increasing, the
function of the legislative branch must
necessarily be that of a general policy
1. In Gallion, "the Utah Supreme Court affirmed on grounds that
the Constitution of Utah prohibits the legislature from
delegating both legislative and executive powers to a single
person, and further, that the power to define conduct as
criminal is exclusively reserved to the legislature by both
statute and case law." 1978 Utah L. Rev. 399 (footnotes
omitted).

making body and that it cannot spell out
all of the details of the administration
and application of law. Consequently# it
is necessary that the executive branch
(e.g., administrative agencies . . . ), in
order to carry out the responsibilities
imposed upon them, have the power to make
rules and regulations that must be
complied with, and that failure to comply
must have sanctions or penalties, and that
they therefore must have the force of law.
572 P.2d at 690.
In addition to the Controlled Substances Act, other
legislation has defined the general crime and then left to an
administrative agency the responsibility of specifying the
prohibited activity. As long as the rules and regulations
promulgated under such legislation meet due process
requirements, they should be enforceable.
I cannot reverse this case solely on the authority of
Gallion.

&»*ct & m**^
Russell W. Bench, Judge
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STATE v. GALL10N
Cite as 572 P.2d 683

of trial judge unless his judgment is clearly
arbitrary or capricious and not based on the
evidence.
Lyle J. Barnes, Kaysville, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Robert B Hansen, Atty. Gen., Franklyn
B. Matheson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, Ernest W. Jones, Asst. Weber County
Atty., Ogden, for defendant and respondent.
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
This case was before us in 1976 wherein
Mrs. Wilson appealed from a ruling of the
trial court to the effect that she, as a
grandmother, had no standing to interfere
with the Family Services Division in its
placement of her grandson for adoption.1
This Court reversed and held that the blood
relationship between grandparent and
grandchild is such that the court should
have continued a stay of proceedings order
until the grandmother could have her day
in court.
That day as now been had. Mrs. Wilson's
counsel called the members of the defendant's committee on the placement of children and tried to show that they acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in placing the
child in an adoptive home. He also tried to
show that the committee never considered
his client as a possible person to adopt the
child Mrs. Wilson also gave testimony as
to her ability to rear the child, etc.
The trial court heard the testimony and
held that in considering the placement of
the child for adoption, the defendant (respondent) did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in any manner. All the committee
witnesses testified that they had seriously
considered the grandmother as one to w horn
adoption could be permitted, but that the
welfare of the child was the paramount
item in making the determination that they
made.
[1,2] At the hearing from which this
appeal was taken, the witnesses were still

of the opinion that the child should be left
in the home in which he has resided for
several years past. The trial court was
justified in ruling as it did, and we should
not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial judge unless his judgment is clearly
arbitrary or capricious and not based on the
evidence.
In this case, the judge learned that Mrs.
Wilson had been married three times; that
she refused to speak to the mother of the
child; that the mother voluntarily surrendered the child to the defendant for the
purpose of adoption and specifically requested that the defendant not place the
child with the grandmother. The court acted properly in making its ruling.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs are awarded.
CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.,
concur.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the result
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^ KEYNUMBERSYSTEM>

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Debra Kay GALLION, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 14966.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 17, 1977.
State appealed from order of the
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., which quashed information
which charged defendant with making a
false or forged prescription for controlled
substance. The Supreme Court, Maughan,
J., held that: (1) provision of the Controlled

1. Wilson v Family Semces, Utah, 554 P 2d 227 (1976)
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Substances Act authorizing the Attorney
General to add or delete substances from
the list of controlled substances was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to an individual charged with exercising functions of the executive department, and (2) provision of the Controlled
Substances Act violated provision of the
criminal code abolishing common-law
crimes and providing that no conduct is a
crime unless made so by the criminal code
or by other applicable statute or ordinance.
Affirmed.
Crockett, J., concurred separately and
filed an opinion.
Ellett, C. J., dissented and filed an
opinion.
1. Drugs and Narcotics <§=>71
Necessary element of the crime of
making a false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance is
that the proscribed conduct involve a controlled substance. U.C.A.1953, 58-378(4)(a).
2. Constitutional Law e=»50
Constitutional provision that the powers of government shall be divided into
three distinct departments and that no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of those departments shall exercise any functions appertaining-to either of the others except in
cases expressly directed or permitted is intended to prohibit the concentration of legislative and executive powers in one person.
Const, art. 5, § 1.
3. Constitutional Law e=»62(l)
Since inhibitions of constitutional prohibition against any person charged with
exercise of the powers of one department of
government exercising any functions appertaining to either of the other two departments of government are directed toward
specific persons, there is nothing to restrain
legislative department from creating administrative bodies to exercise legislative
functions. Const, art. 5, § 1.

4. Constitutional Law <§=»60
Intent expressed by constitutional prohibition against any person who is charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of the three distinct departments of government from exercising any
functions appertaining to either of the other two is not to proscribe delegation of
legislative power but rather to prevent
those who exercise power assigned by the
constitution to their department from aggrandizement of their power, however derived, by exercising functions appertaining
to another department. Const, art. 5, § 1.
5. Constitutional Law <e=>62(l)
Constitutional prohibition against any
person who is charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of the
three distinct departments of government
from exercising any functions appertaining
to either of the other two is not directed
towards the delegation of legislative power
per se but proscribes the conferring of legislative functions on specified persons in the
executive department to avert any potential for>tyranny by concentrating power in
those individuals. Const art. 5, § 1.
6. Constitutional Law <s=>62(5)
Drugs and Narcotics <&=»43
Provision of a Controlled Substances
Act that the Attorney General shall administer the act and may add or delete substances or reschedule all substances enumerated in the act is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to an individual charged with exercising powers of
the executive department. Const, art. 5,
§ 1; U.C.A.1953, 58-37-3(2).
7. Drugs and Narcotics <s=>43
Provision of the Controlled Substances
Act allowing the Attorney General to add
or delete substances from the lists of controlled substances conflicts with provision
of the criminal code abolishing common-law
crimes and providing that no conduct is a
crime unless made so by the criminal code
or by other applicable statute or ordinance.
U.C.A.1953, 58-37-3(2), 76-1-105.
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Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., William W.
Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
Noall T. Wootton, Utah County Atty.,
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant.
Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for defendant
and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
The state appeals from an order of the
district court quashing an information filed
against defendant. Defendant was charged
with a violation of Section 58-37-8(4) D
(a)(iii), U.C.A.1953, as enacted in 1972, that
she altered a forged prescription for a
Schedule II controlled substance, demerol.
Conviction under this section provides the
penalty for a felony in the third degree.
We affirm.
In Section 58-37-4(3Xb), the substances
which were determined by the legislature to
be included in Schedule II were set forth.
The substance, demerol, does not appear
therein. The state asserted in a memorandum to the trial court that the attorney
general had added demerol to Schedule II
in accordance with the Utah Controlled
Substances Act, Title 58, Chapter 37. Specifically the state claimed:
. . . Since the adoption of the
Controlled Substance Act, Demerol has
been added to the controlled substance
list, a true list being in the possession of
Dr. Wesley Parish, a chemist, located at
815 West Columbia Lane, Provo, Utah1

(lii) To make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance, or to alter the same or to alter
any prescription or written order issued
or written pursuant to the terms of this
act.
Thus a necessary element of the crime
charged is that the proscribed conduct involves a controlled substance. Section 5837-2(5) provides:
The words 'controlled substance' mean
a drug, substance, or immediate precursor
in schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of section
58-37-4. . . .
Under the legislative design, one of the
consequences of scheduling a substance is
the determination of the penalty for the
crime, viz., the penalties for acts proscribed
under section 58-37-8(1) A and (5) E are
more severe for controlled substances in
schedules I and II than those in III, IV, and
V. Section 58-37-3(2) provides:
The attorney general of the state of
U^ah shall administer the provisions of
this act and may add or delete substances
or reschedule all substances enumerated
in the schedule in section 58-37-4. .
Thus power is conferred on the attorney
general to define a crime, viz., to proscribe
conduct not previously deemed criminal under the Controlled Substances Act, and to
designate the penalty therefor by the scheduling of the substance.

[1] The trial court granted the motion
to quash on the ground provisions in the
Utah Controlled Substances Act under
which the attorney general added demerol
as a controlled substance were an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
Section 58-37-8(4) D (a), under which defendant was charged, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly and intentionally:

Is the grant of power to the attorney
general to amend, in effect, the act by
adding, deleting or rescheduling a controlled substance unconstitutional? Article
V, Section I, Constitution of Utah, provides:
The powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislate e, the
Executne, and the Judicial, and no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these de-

1. Although the defendant specificalh asserted
the issue that demerol v>as not proscribed in
Schedule II, the state did not proffer am evidence to show compliance with Sec 58-375(3)
"every substance controlled b>

the attome> general to have effect shall be
certified and filed with the office of the secretary of state The secretary of state shall keep
a permanent register of the rules or controls
certified "
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partments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed
or permitted.
The attorney general is a member of the
Executive Department, Article VII, Section
1. He is the legal advisor of the State
officers, Article VII, Section 18. In Hansen
v. Barlow2 this court ruled it is within the
right of the attorney general, if not his
duty, to bring suits to clarify the constitutionality of laws enacted by the Legislature
if he deems it appropriate. Under the Controlled Substances Act, a person charged
with the exercise of executive powers,
which in the case of the attorney general,
includes the duty to challenge the constitutionality of a law, is assigned a function3
appertaining to the legislative department.
The conflict is obvious, the person, who is to
be alert to possible constitutional infirmities, is participating in the legislative process by determining an essential element of
a crime and the penalty. By this act, the
attorney general is consigned to the anomalous position of exercising a potential challenge to a law he has, in fact, amended.
[2] If Article V, Section 1, has any purpose it is to prohibit the concentration of
legislative and executive powers in one person. The adherence to federal case law
concerning the delegation of legislative
power does not resolve the dilemma of interpreting Article V, Section 1, for there is
no comparable provision in the Constitution
of the United States.
As pointed out in 1 Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise, Section 2.02, p. 79:
The non-delegation doctrine is wholly
judgemade. The Constitution provides
merely: 'All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States . . .' The power
2. 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969)
3. In State ex rel Black v Burch, 226 Ind 445,
80 NE2d 294, 302 (1948) the court, m interpreting a constitutional provision similar to Article V, Sec 1, observed that the words "power" and "functions" were interchangeable, but

is also granted 'to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers/
Some congressional powers must obviously be delegated, including the powers 'to
collect taxes/ 'to borrow money/ 'to coin money/ and 'to raise and
support Armies/ Delegation was not discussed at the Constitutional Convention,
except that a motion by Madison that the
President be given power 'to execute such
other powers . . .
as may from
time to time be delegated by the national
Legislature' was defeated as unnecessary.
Davis points out as palpably unsound the
assertion by the Supreme Court in 1911 that
"the authority to make administrative rules
is not a delegation of legislative power, nor
are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative character because the
violation thereof is punished as a public
offense."4 Davis contends the assertion
that authority as to what the law shall be is
not delegable is clearly false, for virtually
every statute creating an administrative
agency delegates authority to determine
what the law shall be. Davis claims that
the recent opinions of the Supreme Court
have generally been reasonably frank in
recognizing that the law making power is
delegable.5 More recently Davis has stated:
The non-delegation doctrine is almost a
complete failure. It has not prevented a
delegation of legislative power. Nor has
it accomplished its later purpose of assuring that delegated power will be guided
by meaningful standards. More importantly, it has failed to provide needed
protection against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power. The time
has come for the courts to acknowledge
that the non-delegation doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to
if there be any distinction the term "functions"
would denote a broader field of activities than
the word "power "
4. Id p 77.
5. Id p 78.
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protect against arbitrary administrative
power.6
The delegation doctrine in this jurisdiction is not judge-made law but has a foundation in our state constitution. However,
the express language in Article V, Section 1
is addressed specifically to another aspect
of the delegation than that developed in the
federal case law.
[3] In this case the prohibition of section 1, is directed to a "person" charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to the "executive department."
The Constitution further specifies in Article
VII, Section 1, the persons of whom the
Executive Department shall consist. Thus
it is the "persons" specified in Article VII,
Section 1, who are charged with the exercise of powers belonging to the Executive
Department, who are prohibited from exercising any functions appertaining to the
legislative and judicial departments. Since
, the inhibitions of the Article V, Section 1,
are directed toward specific "persons,"
there is nothing to restrain the legislative
department from creating administrative
bodies to exercise legislative functions, viz.,
'rule making. Although administrative bodies are nominally designated a part of the
executive branch, they do not fall within
the Constitutional definition of the Execute e Department and the prohibition of Article V, Section 1 does not apply thereto.
[4] The intent expressed in Article V,
Section 1, was not to proscribe the delegation
of legislative power, although under Article
VI, Section 1, there are limitations in this
regard, but to prevent those, who exercise
the power assigned by the Constitution to
their department, from aggrandizement of
their power, however derived, by exercising
functions appertaining to another department.
The purpose of the provision is aptly expressed in Story, on the Constitution (5th
Ed.), Section 523, p. 392:
6

- Daus, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970
Supplement, Sec 2 00, p. 40

7. Clayton v Bennett, 5 Uah 2d 152, 298 P 2d
531, 535 (1956), Row ell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 Uah 353, 358, 99 P2d 1 (1940)

And the Federalist has with equal
point and brevity remarked, that 'the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may be justly pronounced the
very definition of tyranny/
[5] In essence, Article V, Section 1 is
not directed towards the delegation of legislative power per se but proscribes the conferring of legislative functions on specified
persons in the executive department to
avert any potentiality for tyranny by concentrating power in these individuals.
[6] The other aspect of this case which
merits response is wrhether the Controlled
Substances Act has improperly delegated
legislative power. The State through the
attorney general, contends the statute confers no more than the traditional administrative powers. This court has reiterated
the Legislature may:
. . . provide for the execution
through administrative agencies of its
legislative policy, and may confer upon
such administrative officers certain powers and the duty of determining the question of the existence of certain facts upon
which the effect or execution of its legislate e policy may be dependent.7
On the other hand, this court has stated:
The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essential
legislative function with which it is thus
vested.
. 8
In Western Leather and Finding Company9 this court observed that the imposition
of a tax and the designation of those who
must pay the same is such an essential
legislative function as may not be transferred to others. In The v. State Tax Com8. Western Leather and Finding Co v State Tax
Commission, 87 ttah 227, 231, 48 P 2d 526, 528
(1935)
9. Note 8, supra
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mission10 this court ruled that giving to the
Tax Commission the power to determine in
its own judgment the amount of the penalty was a legislative function which could
not be delegated. In State v. Johnson11
this court held that under the Constitution,
the courts may not denounce and punish as
crimes acts and omissions not made punishable by statute, for it is a legislative power
to declare acts as crimes and to prescribe
proper penalties.

Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may
rightfully exercise itself. . . . The
line has not been exactly drawn which
separates those important subjects, which
must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in
which a general provision may be made,
and power given to those who are to act
under such general provisions to fill up
the details.' If the Supreme Court had
consistently followed this lead, the law of
[7] The constitutional standard set forth
the subject might be much more satisfacin State v. Johnson is incorporated in the
tory.
Utah Criminal Code. Section 76-1-105, as
The state does not cite any case wherein
enacted in 1973, amended 1974, provides:
conduct not previously deemed criminal has
Common law crimes are abolished and
been so denounced and the penalty set
no conduct is a crime unless made so by
through the administrative process.
this code, other applicable statute or ordiThe instant case must be distinguished
nance.
from United States v. Grimaud}* wherein
The Controlled Substances Act, is in con- the court ruled there was not an unconstituflict with this provision, for under the act, - tional delegation of legislative power to the
conduct may be made a crime, by an admin- Secretary of Agriculture. The secretary
istrative ruling certified by the attorney was granted power to make rules and regugeneral and filed in the office of the secre- lations covering forest reservations. Contary of state, Section 58-37-5.
gress made it a crime to violate the rules
and regulations made by the secretary purMost recently, in Belt v. Turner12 this
suant to the authority granted in the statcourt stated:
ute. The secretary made a rule forbidding
The power of the legislature to repeal stock grazing on the forest reservation
or amend the penalty to be imposed for without a permit. The issue before the
crime is not a matter of judicial concern. court was whether the forest reserve act of
It is part of the sovereign power of the 1897 was unconstitutional, insofar as it delstate, and it is the exclusive right of the egated to the Secretary of Agriculture powlegislature to change or amend it; .
er to make rules and regulations, and made
Thus this court has recognized there are a violation thereof a penal offense. The
certain essential legislative functions which court stated:
cannot be transferred to others.
The subjects as to which the
This issue is reflected in 1 Davis, AdminSecretary can regulate are defined. The
istrative Law Treatise, Section 2.02, pp. 80lands are set apart as a forest reserve.
81:
He is required to make provision to proPossibly the most helpful early history
tect them from depredations and from
is a distinction drawn by Chief Justice
harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preMarshall: 'It will not be contended that
serve the forests from destruction.' A
Congress can delegate to the courts or to
violation of reasonable rules regulating
any other Tribunal, powers which are
the use and occupancy of the property is
strictly and exclusively legislative. But
10. 89 Utah 404, 416-417, 57 P2d 734 (1936)
11. 44 Utah 38, 26, 137 P 632 (1913).
12. 25 Utah 2d 380, 381, 483 P2d 425 (1971)

13. 220 US 506, 31 S Ct 480, 55 LEd. 563
(1911)
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made a crime, not by the Secretary, but
by Congress. The statute, not the Secretary, fixes the penalty.
. The Secretary did not exercise the legislative power of declaring the
penalty or fixing the punishment for
grazing sheep without a permit, but the
punishment is imposed by the act itself.
14

In the Controlled Substances Act, the administrator not only determines that a substance should be controlled, he further
schedules the substance, which in effect,
declares the magnitude of the penalty and
fixes the punishment. The administrator is
exercising an essential legislative function
which cannot be transferred to him.
A challenge similar to the instant one
was made in Howell v. State,1* wherein it
was urged that the Mississippi Controlled
Substances Act was unconstitutional insofar as it conferred on the State Board of
Health authority to schedule or reschedule
a controlled substance. The state argued
the legislative grant of authority wras proper since the Board was given only fact-finding authority to classify dangerous substances and was provided with guidelines
for making its determinations. The court
observed that the question of the validity of
the grant of authority arose because, under
the Uniform Controlled Substances Law,
the penalties prescribed for violations are
inextricably tied to the various schedules.
The court said:
. The practical effect of moving a substance from one schedule and
placing it in another is to increase or
diminish the criminal penalty for violation of the act. It is likewise true that, if
substances are added to or deleted from
any of the schedules such action makes
acts pertaining to the substances so added
a crime, and as to substances deleted,
abolishes a crime. The result is that the

State Board of Health is given the authority to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.
The exclusive authority of the legislature to define crimes and fix the punishment therefor is without question.16
The court cited case law from Mississippi,
with rulings similar to those cited herein in
Tite v. State Tax Commission, note 10 supra, and State v. Johnson, note 11, supra.
The court cited case law from other jurisdictions wherein it has been held the power
to define crimes and the punishment therefor is vested in the legislature.
The court held that the authority to
define crimes and fix the punishment therefor is vested exclusively in the legislature,
and it may not delegate that power either
expressly or by implication, but must exercise it under Article 4, Section 33 of the
Constitution of Mississippi.17
In United States v. Pastor18 the defendant argued that the federal act (Drug
Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. Section. 811) granting
authority to the attorney general to schedule controlled substances constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Although the court cited United
States v. Grimaud}9 it overlooked the qualification set forth, viz., that Congress not
the administrator had set the penalty. The
court acknowledged the ruling in Howell v.
Mississippi, but declined to follow it, noting
that the anti-delegation doctrine had retained much greater vitality in the state
courts than it had in the federal courts.
There are sound reasons for ruling the
definition of a crime and the precise punishment therefor to be essential legislative
functions, which cannot be transferred.
Criminal trials would be unduly complicated, for the defendant would have the right
to challenge :he administrative procedure
and the findings where a substance has
been scheduled or rescheduled. A similar

M. at pp. 522-523 of 220 U.S., at p. 485 of 31
S.Ct.

17. This provision vests the legislative power in
the legislature.

15. Miss., 300 So.2d 774 (1974).

18. 419 F.Supp. 1316 (1976).

16. at pp. 779-780 of 300 So.2d.

19. note 13, supra.
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determination by the legislature could not
be challenged. The administrative rulings
are not statutes and are not incorporated
into the code, a person who wishes to abide
by the law would have to resort to the
permanent register kept by the secretary of
state to determine the status of a substance.20

utive branch (eg., administrative agencies
such as the Public Service Commission, the
Industrial Commission and the Tax Commission), in order to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon them, have the power
to make rules and regulations that must be
complied with, and that failure to comply
must have sanctions or penalties, and that
they therefore must have the force of law.

There is a certain peril involved if administrative procedures can be applied to the
Even though the legislature cannot delecriminal law. Why couldn't an administragate the power to make laws to an executor revise the penalties in Section 76-6-412,
tive officer,1 it may enact laws which take
according to the consumer price index or a
effect upon the ascertainment of certain
determination that there had been an exfacts and conditions, and may delegate the
cessive amount of theft of property valued
duty to determine the existence of such
at less than $100. A determination of the
elements of a crime and the appropriate facts2 to executive or administrative offipunishment therefor are, under our Consti- cers. Whether a particular delegation of
tutional system, judgments, which must be power is valid depends upon whether the
legislature has prescribed sufficient stanmade exclusively by the legislature.
dards or limitations to guide the exercise of
that power in accordance with its will.3
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring separately).
I concur in affirming the ruling of the
district court that there is no proper foundation for charging the defendant with a
crime for possession of "demerol" as a controlled substance. But I have reservations
about some aspects of the main opinion and
therefore state my own reasons for my
conclusion.

It is a cardinal principle of due process
that a person is entitled to reasonable notice, or a means of knowing, what conduct
is prohibited before he can be held criminally responsible for engaging in it.4 In conformity therewith the procedure for the
adoption of such a rule, and the rule itself,
must be of such a nature and sufficiently
clear and definite that persons of ordinary
intelligence who would abide by the lawT
will knowr how to conform to its requirements.5

- It is to be conceded that the legislature
cannot delegate legislative powers to executive or administrative officers or departments. However, it is also to be realized
that due to the complexities of human society, wrhich are ever increasing, the function
of the legislative branch must necessarily
be that of a general policy making body and
that it cannot spell out all of the details of
the administration and application of law.
Consequently, it is necessary that the exec-

Consistent with the foregoing, the legislature has authorized the Attorney General to
carry out the policy of the Act under appropriate safeguards U.C.A 1953, sections 5837-3 through 7 list various factors for the
Attorney General to consider in determining whether to control a substance. These
include the potential of the substances for
abuse, or a history and current pattern of

20. Here, apparently one would need to search
out a chemist in Provo, Utah

3. Rowell v State Board of Agriculture, supra
note 1

1. Young v Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 321, 67 P 2d
1066(1902), Rowell v State Board of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P 2d 1 (1940)

4. State v Timmons, 12 Wash App 48, 527 PJ2d
1399 (1974)

2. Id , 16 CJ S Constitutional Law § 138

5. Greaves v State, Utah, 528 P2d 805 (1974),
U S v Hamss, 347 U S 612, 74 S Ct 808, 98
LEd 989
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abuse, whether the substance is controlled
under federal law and whether it is an
immediate precursor of a substance already
controlled under the Act; and the current
state of scientific knowledge of the substance and the effects of its use.
In regard to the requirement of notice to
the public, Section 58-37-5(3) provides:
every substance controlled by
the attorney general to have effect shall
be certified and filed with the office of
the secretary of state. The secretary of
state shall keep a permanent register of
the rules or controls certified [Emphasis
added ]
It should be obvious to anyone reading
those statutes, conferring such powers on
the Attorney General, that in order to meet
the requirements of due process of law,
there must be compliance with the requirements, both as to the certification, and the
filing in the office of the Secretary of State
the statement as to any drug so prohibited,
so that there is notice in that public office,
where it can be examined by anyone who
has an interest therein.
As indicated in the main opinion, the
State did not establish that the statutory
requirements above referred to had been
complied with; and particularly it was not
shown that there had been the filing with
the Secretary of State; but there wras some
evidence indicating to the contrary. In
view of that failure there is no foundation
upon which to conclude that the Attorney
General's designation of demerol as a controlled substance provides a \alid basis for
charging and prosecution for crime For
these reasons I join in affirming the trial
court's decision.

mg because of their effect on the central
nervous system, or which has a potential
for abuse because of their depressant or
stimulant effect on the central nervous system; or which has a hallucinogenic effect
on the user.
The legislature sought to control the use
of all such drugs and thereby protect those
of its citizens \* ho might use them to their
own damage and harm. It realized that
there might be other harmful substances
not then known which would be equally
dangerous to users and so a provision was
inserted into the law 2 that authorized the
Attorney General of the State of Utah to
add such substances to the list of proscribed
drugs.
The authority thus given to the attorney
general is not, in my opinion, a delegation
of legislative pow ers. He is strictly limited
in his determination as to wThether the substance is injurious to the user. The substance must be of one of the classes set out
in the statute. Notice of a hearing to determine whether the new drug should be
placed on the list is required to be given,
and the right to be heard must be afforded
to all interested persons. The statute 3 provides that any person who is, or who may
be, affected by a designation of any such
listed substance has a right to a judicial
determination of the validity of the rule or
control by filing an action for declaratory
relief in the district court of Salt Lake
County. The court may also declare the
rule in\ alid for a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the act relating
to the procedure for ascertaining the classification of the new drug.

The legislature listed 120 drugs as "controlled substances," * i. e. substances that
the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare or the Attorney General of the
United States has found after investigation
and by regulation designated as habit form-

The photal question in this case is, therefore, whether the power of the attorney
general to add drugs to the controlled substances schedule is a grant of an unconfmed, \agrant power; or whether his function is merely to determine the facts upon
which legislative policy depends and to exercise discretion in a narrow area defined
by ascertainable standards.

1. U C A , as amended, 58-37-4

3. U C A . a s amended, 58-37-5(b)(7)

ELLETT, Chief Justice (dissenting)

2. U C A , as amended, 58-37-3
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The appropriate test to be applied in determining this question was articulated in
the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in
Revne v. Trade Commission:4
To require rigid and minutely defined
standards or guides where the matters to
be regulated are of such a nature as to
require flexibility, might prevent needed
remedies. Otherwise, the legislature
would be required to anticipate all possible situations which might arise and itself
supply a rule or guide to fit each such
situation, a requirement which might be
palpably impossible.
Roughly, the measure of the detail content of standards or guides is what the
matter or subject to be regulated will
practically admit of. Otherwise, the legislature could not exercise its power to
regulate what might acutely need regulation because the diversity and complexity
of the regulative problems involved,
would not practically admit the setting of
sufficiently detailed standards.

I would reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for trial on the
merits.

(£
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DIRECT IMPORT BUYER'S ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
K. S. L., INC., Defendant and
Respondent
No. 14908.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 22, 1977.

To resolve the question of the constitutionality of the statute in this case, all that
remains is to determine if the attorney general^ power to add drugs to the controlled
list is subject to those rules and guides that
the legislature could be reasonably expected
to provide.
It seems to me that there is no merit to
the contention that there exists in the law
any denial of equal protection or of any
unconstitutional delegation of authority.

Suit was brought against television station for alleged falsehoods broadcast whereby product sold by plaintiff was stated to
be> less efficient as a gasoline saver than
plaintiff claimed it to be. Following reversal of summary judgment for defendant,
538 P.2d 1040, the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., directed a
verdict for defendant at the conclusion of
the evidence, and plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., held that: (1)
in case of alleged defamation of a product
of a business, special damages must be alleged and proved, plaintiff must prove that
the product is not as represented by defendant but is in fact as plaintiff claims it to be,
and actual malice must be shown; (2) newscaster cannot be held liable for accurately
reporting erroneous information when he
believes the source to be reliable and truthful; (3) in the instant case, in which there
were no false statements made, aside from
repeating erroneous sales figures given reporter by plaintiff's product manager, and
in which the effect of the statements was
simply that claims made about plaintiffs

4.

5. 5 Utah 2d 152, 156, 298 P 2d 531, 534 (1956).

This standard was applied by this Court
in Clayton v. Bennett} In that case, plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of a statute relating to the licensing of architects
because, inter alia, it was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. In upholding the statute, this Court noted:
. . certain basic qualifications
relating to education, age, moral character and the requirement of satisfactorily
passing an examination are set forth in
the statutes. It seems obvious that the
legislature could go no further than to set
up such general standards.

113 Utah 155, 186, 192 P.2d 563, 579 (1948)

